

STATEMENT

of
The Third Kyoto Conference of Scientists

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July 2, 1966

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STATEMENT

At the first Kyoto Conference of Scientists held four years ago, we affirmed our belief that the ever-increasing danger of the destruction of humanity as a result of nuclear warfare had ruled out war as a means of solving international disputes, and that Article IX of the Japanese Constitution, in which Japan renounces war, had assumed an even greater significance than at the time of its enactment. We also made it clear that the same considerations obliged us to oppose the policy of using nuclear weapons as a deterrent against war, since this policy, far from tending to do away with war, led in precisely the opposite direction.

At the second Kyoto Conference of Scientists held the following year, we stressed that the existence of a state of hostility between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China was a source of tension in Asia and a serious obstacle to the establishment of world peace, and that for Japan to stand by its principle of rejecting nuclear armament would constitute a major contribution to the cause of world peace.

Since then, however, the international situation has progressed steadily in the direction we most feared; the deterioration has been particularly marked recently, with the bombing of the Hanoi and Haiphong areas.

For three days, from June 30 to July 2, 1966, we debated the questions of nuclear warfare and peace; as a result, we affirmed yet again our support for the 'Einstein principle' that the objective of avoiding total destruction must have priority over any other objective, and unanimously agreed on the following statement of our views.

The tendency towards the massive buildup and diversification of nuclear weapon systems, as typified by mobile nuclear missile bases such as the Polaris-type atomic submarine, has shown a marked accentuation recently. As goes without saying, anything in which the possibility of loading or transporting nuclear weapons is not definitely ruled out constitutes an important element in a system of war potential based on nuclear weapons.

Despite the partial nuclear test ban agreement signed in August, 1963, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have gone ahead with their underground nuclear tests; moreover, the technological development of various types of nuclear weapons, including anti-missile-missiles, has proceeded even more energetically than before. In the last few years in particular, the so-called "strategic" nuclear weapons—the weapons of mass slaughter—have been joined by "tactical" nuclear weapons designed to be readily usable in local fighting, and combat units are already being equipped with these weapons. One

sometimes encounters statements conveying the impression that tactical nuclear weapons and conventional weapons are somehow similar. In fact, however, there is a strict distinction, both scientifically speaking and in the savagery of their effect, between conventional weapons and nuclear weapons, of whatever kind. Between the destructive powers of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, almost no qualitative distinction can be drawn, while quantitatively and technically there is no barrier to development in either direction between the two.

Nowadays, the nuclear deterrent policy—the policy which relies on nuclear retaliatory potential as a means of checking the outbreak of a general war—is coming to seem increasingly risky. In a world of highly organized nuclear war potentials, tactical nuclear weapons, once used, would inevitably expand any war—whatever its political nature—into a catastrophic conflict in which strategic nuclear weapons would eventually come into play. It must be realized that the development of tactical nuclear weapons means that even a conflict with conventional weapons is liable, when backed up with a nuclear potential, to expand into a conflict using nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the addition of nations such as the Republic of France and the People's Republic of China to the ranks of the nuclear powers has created a situation where any maintenance of stability through a "balance of power" between opposing forces, such as is implied by the nuclear deterrent policy, is becoming increasingly unfeasible.

With the increasing ineffectuality of the policy of preventing general war by relying on the maintenance of strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons are being subject to limitless development simply as a means to destruction and slaughter; if things continue in this fashion, man will eventually find himself living in a terrifying environment in which the whole surface of the globe, including outer space and the oceans, is crisscrossed with the nuclear weapon systems of the various powers.

A state of affairs in which the nuclear deterrent policy is becoming increasingly ineffective and bankrupt, and in which more and more nations are becoming caught up in the race to develop nuclear weapons is, in itself, an undoubted factor increasing the danger of nuclear war. That mankind should, notwithstanding, have succeeded so far in averting a catastrophic nuclear war is due less to any function of the nuclear weapon systems as such than to the will for peace of mankind and its rejection of nuclear war. We should do well to recall today the point made in the Russell-Einstein Manifesto—that mankind's intense desire for the abolition of war stems from its confrontation with the horror of nuclear weapons.

Any attempt to guarantee the security of nations by a "balance of power" must inevitably lead to a limitless arms race and make the establishment of permanent peace impossible. If a lasting peace is to be created and a new world order established, an indispensable prerequisite is mutual trust, involving efforts to

discover and further extend the points in common between the interests and systems of values of the nations concerned. We would stress, moreover, that this notion is not mere idealism but has a firm foundation in reality.

In this sense, the passage in the preamble to the Constitution of Japan which reads "we have determined to trust in the justice and faith of the peace-loving people of the world in preserving our security and existence" embodies a high degree of rationality and political wisdom. The Japanese people must eschew all idea of guaranteeing its own security through reliance, in whatever form, on nuclear weapons, and must choose instead that course which, by denouncing nuclear weapons, will lead to lasting peace.

Our aim is to strengthen international solidarity among scientists on the basis of their responsibility as scientists, irrespective of differences in the political and economic systems of the nations to which they belong, and to direct a joint effort towards securing general acceptance of the idea just outlined among the peoples of the world. In the same way, it is our intention to join with others from all walks of life in maintaining a constant vigil against moves which run counter to this idea, thus playing a positive part in the mighty task of creating a new era of peace.

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