





To  
Dr. + Mrs. Yukawa  
in appreciation  
from  
Montclair State Teachers'  
College.  
25 April 1958.

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY  
*The State University of New Jersey*

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE

PATERSON DIVISION

STATE TEACHERS COLLEGE BUILDING  
50 NINETEENTH AVENUE  
PATERSON, NEW JERSEY

77 Edgemont Road  
Upper Montclair, N.J.  
11 April 1950

Dr. Hidekei Yukawa  
501 West 121st St.  
New York 27, New York

Dear Dr. Yukawa:

We are all very happy indeed that you are coming to our college on Tuesday, April 25th. I shall drive to New York for you and Mrs. Yukawa, arriving there about 8:40 a.m., and drive you back to New York also. Mrs. Young says to tell you to bring your boys also if that is possible.

Now about the details you want. We have an hour for your program. After about 15 minutes are subtracted (for purposes of introductory remarks and announcements), there is a good 40 minutes for you and Mrs. Yukawa. We would like the 3 dances by your wife. The time left after her dancing will be the time for your address. I hope this gives you a clear idea as to the time element.

As for the subject matter of your address. 1. We would like some remarks about what the meson theory may imply in the future of scientific development. This would need to be as "non-technical" as possible for us laymen! 2. Perhaps some remarks about the best possible means, as you see it, for the best possible understanding between Japan and the United States, would be very appropriate. But you use your own judgment. It just seems so logical to hear something from a great scientist about his science, and about the future possible relations between our nation and yours.

With anticipation of the 25th of April, I remain

Sincerely yours,

*Fredrick H. Young*

P.S. Just two or three other items:

1. If it is a clear and warm day, the program will be presented in our beautiful outdoor theatre; if not, then it will be presented in our gymnasium which is our largest available indoor auditorium.
2. I have only asked this once before in my life (the time when Thomas Mann sent me a beautiful, autographed photo of himself upon my request): ---but now I ask you please to give me an autographed photo of yourself for my study.
3. Is there a free Saturday, before you return to Japan, when

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Mrs. Young and I make take you to the beautiful Sho-Fu-Den estate (Dr. Takamini's former home) in Monticello, New York? Tuesdays and Sundays are also possible days for us to take you, if these days are more convenient for you and Mrs. Yukawa. It is only an 85 mile trip from New York.

4. Can you return to our home on April 25th, for a tea in the afternoon, after the luncheon at college?



# Charles Sanders Peirce

America's Greatest Logician and  
Most Original Philosopher

A Paper By

**The Reverend Frederic Harold Young, S.T.B.**  
Minister of St. Stephen's Episcopal Church, Newark, N. J.  
and  
Fellow in Philosophy, Graduate College, Princeton University

Delivered 15 October 1945, at Milford, Pennsylvania,  
before the Pike County Historical Society

To my  
great friend,  
Dr. Hideki Yukawa  
with the compliments  
of the author,  
Frederic N. Young.

25 April 1950.

CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE  
America's Greatest Logician and  
Most Original Philosopher

I.

In this community where he spent the last twenty-seven years of his life, or more than a third of his lifetime, and where he composed so many of those papers which, since his death, have increasingly brought him world-recognition as a logician and philosopher, we are met under the auspices of The Pike County Historical Society to honor Charles Sanders Peirce. We are met to honor him, not only on and for this passing occasion, but to inspire a consideration of the best means whereby to establish a worthy memorial to him who was not only one of Milford's most distinguished citizens but who was also the greatest logician and the most original philosopher in our nation's history.

In attempting to achieve an adequate understanding of this remarkable man, our subject inevitably divides itself into two main parts: the one, biographical; the other, critical—that is to say, a statement and estimate of his achievements. We shall consider first the biographical, and then the critical and interpretative aspect of our theme.

Charles Sanders Peirce—he did not acquire the additional name of “Santiago” until middle life—was born in Cambridge, Massachusetts on the tenth of September, 1839, the second son of Benjamin and Sarah Peirce. His father, professor of mathematics at Harvard, was recognized as the foremost mathematician of his time in America, and he took all pains to see that his son was given an incomparable training in the theory and application of physical science, mathematics, and philosophy. His method was to give the boy problems to work, and leave him to induct the general principle from the problems. Most of us experienced sufficient difficulty in working problems with the general formulæ given in advance. What would have been our consciousness of incapacity had we been asked to work our way to the formulæ for ourselves! He also drilled Charles in Chess and other games that required and developed logical ability. Sometimes he played double dummy with his son from ten in the evening until sunrise. The lad was reading Whately's LOGIC at thirteen. Entering Harvard at sixteen and graduating at twenty, he read widely in philosophy. So profoundly conversant was he with German philosophy that in a few years he was to tell the Metaphysical Club, which included such figures as Chauncy Wright, William James, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and a number of other notable minds, that the whole of German philosophy was only a “suggestion” of what true philosophy might be! This was unmitigated heresy to a generation that had based its ethical theory on Kant. But they had to listen to him because of his mastery of Kantian thought. He once remarked that soon after he was twenty he was able to recite the CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON almost word for word.

Two years after his graduation from college he went into the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey, in which activity he remained for thirty years and during a period of which he was Acting Chief of the Survey at Washington. He found time, however, to give lectures at Harvard in the Philosophy of Science when he was thirty. It is interesting to note that he was one of a group of special lecturers which included Ralph Waldo Emerson, James E. Cabot, and John Fiske. In 1877 he was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, before which body he delivered addresses on various occasions.

Although eager to pursue an academic career, he taught only eight years in his life—including logic at Johns Hopkins for five years, and lecturing intermittently at Harvard for three years. His unhappy first marriage is regarded as one factor in preventing him from securing an university chair. At twenty-three, in 1862, he had married Harriett M. Fay, afterward noted in Cambridge as a writer and organizer. He divorced her in 1883 and

shortly afterward married Mademoiselle Juliette Frissy of Nancy, France. The other negative factor seems to have been his own eccentric personality. In the article on Peirce in the *DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY*, his biographer speaks of him as "emotional, easily duped, forgetful of appointments, and careless of appearance in later years." In connection with these remarks, I wish I possessed the advantage enjoyed by some members of this Society in being able to compare these impressions of Peirce with first-hand impressions of one's own.

At the age of forty-eight, in 1887, he retired to this community in Pike County which he regarded as "the wildest county in the northern states." Here he bought the home known to you all, three miles from this spot on the road to Port Jervis, and now known as "Philwood." In that house he wrote some of his greatest papers. He began his literary activities in Milford with writing definitions for *THE CENTURY DICTIONARY*, and with book reviews for *THE NATION*. He was always extravagant financially, and he came to financial grief. It is recorded that he had a ladder leading to his attic, which ladder, after he ascended it, was pulled up, thus enabling him to evade creditors when they happened to appear at the door. By 1906 he was penniless. He applied to the Carnegie Fund to enable him to execute a project he long had contemplated, of producing a twelve-volume work in philosophy. It was to have been his "magnum opus." But the Fund refused a grant on the grounds that they were bound by the terms of the foundation to extend assistance only for work in a "natural science", and logic was not precisely a "natural science." It was during this pathetic period that William James and a few of Peirce's former students secured aid for him through an appeal. It was in recognition of his profound esteem for his dear friend William James, that Peirce added "Santiago" to his name which is, of course, the Spanish for "St. James."

By 1909 he was a man of seventy, suffering from incipient cancer and using morphine regularly to alleviate the pain. However, he stuck to his writing, many times composing until sunrise, as he had so many years before played double dummy with his father the whole night through. Despite the imperial strength of his mind, his body grew weaker and the end grew near. On the 19th of April, 1914, he died of cancer in Milford at the age of seventy-five. To quote his biographer's tersely eloquent words: "... he died . . . , a frustrated, isolated man, still working on his logic, without a publisher, with scarcely a disciple, unknown to the public at large."

In such few and simple words is conveyed, hauntingly enough to transfix the sensitive imagination, a tragic vision of the last years and days of Charles Peirce's earthly pilgrimage. Of all that he wrote, later to fill six large volumes and four others projected, one book only was published during his life. Let us hope that, in the natural beauty of this region, in companionship with his devoted wife, and in the creative outpourings of his magnificent intellect, he found, amid the world's unheeding ways, a joy and peace which the world could neither give nor take away.

## II.

The second part of our task opens before us. We are now to attempt an appreciation of Peirce's attainments in logic and philosophy. Observe that I say appreciation rather than evaluation, since evaluation is possible only to men technically competent to judge. There are two chief authorities on Peirce—Doctors Weiss and Hartshorne—who jointly edited Peirce's papers after his death. An intelligent appreciation of Peirce must rest primarily, then, upon the judgment of these editors. Although I myself have read rather widely in Peirce's writings, there is a marked difference between a student and an authority.

Peirce's manuscript's, after his death, were bought from his wife by the Philosophy Department of Harvard University. What with leaves missing, pages unnumbered, dates omitted, and no sequence apparent on the surface, it was a vast undertaking to edit the hundreds of papers thus acquired. But it was done with consummate ability by the editors and issued in six volumes by the Harvard Press from 1931-1935. The editors have given us

to expect four more volumes at some future date. The titles of the published volumes are indicative of the range of Peirce's speculations:

- VOLUME I : PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY
- VOLUME II : ELEMENTS OF LOGIC
- VOLUME III : EXACT LOGIC
- VOLUME IV : SIMPLEST MATHEMATICS
- VOLUME V : PRAGMATISM AND PRAGMATICISM
- VOLUME VI : SCIENTIFIC METAPHYSICS

Besides the published works, which included material drawn chiefly from the fields of logic, mathematics, pragmatism, and metaphysics, there was a corpus of data in such diverse subject-matters as geodesy, religion, chemistry, astronomy, investigations in English and classical Greek pronunciation, criminology, psychical research, the history of science, Egyptology, ancient history, Napoleon, a thesaurus and editor's manual, and translations from Latin and German. We shall confine our attention to the two areas in which Peirce attained preeminence: logic and pragmatism.

Although he was, as he once said, practically brought up in a laboratory, Peirce regarded himself primarily as a logician. This self-estimate appears to be perfectly accurate, since it is now generally recognized by authorities that he is one of the five or six creative intellects in logic since Aristotle wrote the *ORGANON* over twenty-three centuries ago. Bacon talked much about a *NOVUM ORGANUM*, but Peirce created one. The Peircian canon is itself a monument to one of the most powerful intellects in western thought. Little wonder that William James called him "the most original mind of his generation". He might have added: "and for many generations."

In connection with Peirce's specific accomplishments in logic, I quote at length from Weiss' admirable article in the *DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY*:

"In 1847, George Boole, the founder of modern logic, published *THE MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS OF LOGIC*, followed in 1854 by his definitive work, *AN INVESTIGATION OF THE LAWS OF THOUGHT*. These works, destined to revolutionize the entire science of logic and free it from the thrall of the Aristotelian syllogism were practically unnoticed in America until Peirce . . . referred to Boole's work, and made a number of vital and permanent improvements in the Boolean system . . . (Peirce's) technical papers of 1867-1885 established him as the greatest formal logician of his time, and the most important single force in the period from Boole to Ernst Schroder. These papers are difficult, inaccessible, scattered, and fragmentary, and their value might never have been known if it had not been that Schroder based a large portion of his *VORLESUNGEN UBER DIE ALGEBRA DER LOGIK* on them . . . Peirce radically modified, extended, and transformed the Boolean algebra, making it applicable to propositions, relations, probability and arithmetic. Practically single-handed since De Morgan, Peirce laid the foundations of the logic of relations, the instrument for the logical analysis of mathematics. He invented the copula of inclusion, the most important symbol in the logic of classes, two new logical algebras, two new systems of logical graphs, discovered the link between the logic of classes and the logic of propositions, was the first to give the fundamental principle for the logical development of mathematics, and made exceedingly important contributions to probability theory, induction, and the logic of scientific methodology . . . Many of his more important writings on logic, among which are his detailed papers on his new science of semiotics, he never published, and the final appreciation of his full strength and importance as a logician awaits the assimilation of the posthumous papers."

And in reference to Peirce's mathematical powers, Weiss says:

"In 1867 in his paper *UPON THE LOGIC OF MATHEMATICS*, he clearly anticipated the method for the derivation and definition of number employed in the epochal *PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA* of A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, published in three vol-

umes in 1910-1913 . . . Had all his mathematical papers been published during his lifetime . . . he would have been a more important factor in the history of mathematics than he is today. His work on the logical and philosophical problems of mathematics remains, however, among the foremost in the field." So much for Peirce's eminence as a logician.

In the POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY for January, 1878, appeared an article by Peirce entitled: "How to Make Our Ideas Clear." In this particular article was the statement which afterwards became famous as the "pragmatic maxim" and which led to his reputation as the founder of that philosophical movement in America known during the past fifty years as Pragmatism.

Pragmatism, in laymen's language, is that philosophy particularly concerned with judging the meaning of any thought or experience in terms of its effects and results. Ruggiero, an Italian philosopher, says:

"Pragmatism was born in America, the country of business, and is, par excellence, the philosophy of the business man."

But this is a provincial view for an historian of philosophy to take. Just as idealism, realism, empiricism, and scepticism are permanently recurring tendencies in philosophic thought, so is pragmatism with its appeal to the practical judgment. That is why William James called Pragmatism "a new name for old ways of thinking." Immanuel Kant and Fichte, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, had, among other viewpoints, given stress to the "practical reason", and to the profound element of decision-for-action in the human ego. Kant occasionally used the word "pragmatic."

Returning to Peirce, I quote the maxim itself:

"Consider what effects which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."

It is Peirce's exclusive emphasis upon "effects" as giving us "the whole of our conception of an object" which made him the founder of Pragmatism as a movement in America. Peirce was perfectly clear as to the nature, value, and limitations of this principle. In countering criticism of the maxim he stressed the fact that it was concerned with concepts rather than things, and that it was to be employed as a "principle of method" rather than as a proposition in metaphysics.

Considering the maxim again, observe that the frame of reference is strictly to our conceptions, and not appeal to action or decision such as James later developed. Peirce coined the word "pragmaticism" to distinguish his position from that of James' "pragmatism", with its relatively greater emphasis on the will over the intellect. Peirce's maximum, as conceived and used by him, is a guiding principle of investigation within such fields as semantics, logic, and the epistemology of conception. But it has been applied by James, Dewey, and others to such subject-matter as ethics, sociology, education, and psychology. Watson's doctrine of behaviorism in psychology is an illustration in point of the method of interpreting by "effects" as applied in a specific science; in this case, a reading of the human organism exclusively in terms of its visible, or measurable, responses rather than the emphasis on stimuli as in the older psychology. In a letter from Professor W. T. Stace of the Philosophy Department at Princeton University, it is pointed out that this maxim has been used also by the Logical Positivists in their "verifiability principle of meaning."

Whatever the later applications by Pragmatists and Positivists, Peirce, because of his metaphysical and speculative bent, remained severely intellectualistic in his theory and use of the maxim.

This mention of his speculative bent brings us to a recognition of his metaphysical power. He is perhaps the second mind since Aristotle—the other being Leibniz—to have gone so far in the construction of a completely scientific metaphysics. This point requires no further amplification here, since it is essentially contained in letters that I have received from present-day philosophers, whose estimate of our Philosopher I will shortly read to you.

To indulge in a rapid summary: Peirce was preeminent as mathematician (greater than his father who was the greatest in America) scientist,

logician, and metaphysician. He was the rarest of combinations in any domain of human thought—a man of immense erudition and equally a man of immense originality. In fact, he is a philosopher's philosopher, and that role has belonged to only a few such as Aristotle, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel.

Our foremost creative thinkers in American history may be counted with less than our ten fingers. In the 18th century we produced Jonathan Edwards, Count Rumford (who spent most of his life in exile), Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries we produced Willard Gibbs, Thorstein Veblen, Henry Adams, and Charles Peirce. These eight minds: Edwards in theology and philosophy, Rumford in physics, Franklin in science and statecraft, Jefferson in political science and education; Gibbs in physics, Veblen in economics and anthropology, Adams in social and historico-literary criticism, and Peirce in logic and metaphysics were intellects of the first rank; and among these eight, Peirce is surpassed by none in sheer intellectual power. Weiss concludes his article on Peirce with this estimate: "This much is now certain: he is the most original and versatile of America's philosophers, and America's greatest logician."

I am extremely happy on this occasion to present opinions of Peirce from several outstanding thinkers of the nation and the world, but before I quote from them, it will heighten, with a pathetic irony, the contrast of inappreciation in his own day and the profound appreciation of these days, if Charles Peirce be allowed to speak to us in his own words, taken from the Preface to Volume I of his COLLECTED PAPERS:

"I am a man of whom critics have never found anything good to say. When they could see no opportunity to injure me, they have held their peace. The little laudation I have had has come from such sources, that the only satisfaction I have derived from it, has been from such slices of bread and butter as it might waft my way. Only once, as far as I remember, in all my lifetime have I experienced the pleasure of praise—not for what it might bring but in itself. That pleasure was beatific; and the praise that conferred it was meant for blame. It was that a critic said of me that **I did not seem to be absolutely sure of my own conclusions.** Never, if I can help it, shall that critic's eye ever rest on what I am now writing; for I owe a great pleasure to him; and, such was his evident animus, that should he find that out, I fear the fires of hell would be fed with new fuel in his breast."

He then proceeds:

"My book is meant for people who want to find out; and people who want philosophy ladled out to them can go elsewhere. There are philosophical soup shops at every corner, thank God! . . . The first step toward finding out is to acknowledge you do not satisfactorily know already; so that no blight can so surely arrest all intellectual growth as the blight of cocksureness; and ninety-nine out of every hundred good heads are reduced to impotence by that malady—of whose inroads they are most strangely unaware!"

Now let us attend to the tributes from some of our nationally known philosophers who, upon my solicitations, sent them especially for this occasion. The first quotation is from Sidney Hook, Professor of Philosophy at New York University. By him I was introduced to a study of Peirce:

"More than any one man in the history of human thought, Charles Peirce pointed the way to bridging the age-old dualism between things and human thought. This he did in his epoch-making conception of man as a sign-using animal, and his interpretation of the life of mind as the life inherent in symbols. It is by the use of symbols that man as a piece of nature becomes human; and it is through man's activity directed by symbols that nature becomes meaningful and reasonable. The rich implications of Peirce's fundamental insight are yet to be explored. Today he is just as much the philosopher's philosopher, just as much the pioneer of a second Copernican revolution in thought (one more genuine than Kant's) as he was when his meteoric genius first flashed across American skies."

From Charles Hartshorne, of the Department of Philosophy, the University of Chicago, and co-editor with Paul Weiss of Peirce's papers:

"Besides being a great logician, Peirce was a great mathematician—according to a foremost English authority who was at Johns Hopkins with him, a 'much greater' mathematician than his father, Benjamin Peirce, who had been the leading American mathematician of his day.

"In general philosophy, beyond logic, Peirce wrote brilliantly in several fields. And here, too, his views were revolutionary for his own day, and such as fifty years later came to be widely seen as important. The most ambitious and complete philosophy of our day, that of Whitehead, is more fully anticipated by Peirce, probably, than by anyone of his time, unless, perhaps, William James is an exception.

"... Other important doctrines are his classification of signs, his theory of the three categories, his synechism and tychism (the first and in some respects still the best efforts to do justice to the ideals of continuity and chance in philosophy), and his evolutionary 'agapism.'

"... Peirce, so far as I can find, combined more knowledge of exact science and of the history of ideas with more inventive genius in philosophy than any man of his time... It was the first time since Leibniz that there had been such a phenomenon, a mathematician who was a logician and a physicist and a chemist and a metaphysician. He even did work in experimental psychology."

From Professor F. C. S. Northrop, of the Department of Philosophy, Yale University:

"Charles Santiago Peirce ranks with Willard Gibbs as one of the greatest systematic theoretical and creative minds this country has ever produced. Not only did he formulate certain basic ideas in technical, mathematical, and symbolic logic, but also he laid the technical foundations of the philosophical movement known as pragmatism... For all their technical precision and originality, these doctrines of Peirce's grew out of a thorough understanding of the works of the past, especially those of Immanuel Kant. In the field of empirical logic and scientific method similarly he combined a thorough understanding of the formal mathematical and deductive side of scientific and philosophical procedure with an informed emphasis upon its empirical inductive and pragmatic aspects. When one compares him with previous minds in the history of western thought, one thinks of Aristotle and Leibniz."

From John Dewey, lately retired from the Philosophy Department of Columbia University, and generally regarded as the Dean of American philosophers today:

"C. S. Peirce was ahead of his times intellectually by more than a generation. Psychology and Philosophy are even now only slowly catching up, beginning to understand what he wrote. I note the following points: (1) What is called the 'external world' is not primarily a matter of knowledge but of that 'two-sided' direct interaction of organic-environmental conditions that occurs in 'effort-resistance', the effort side being called 'action', while the influence of the resisting conditions determine the 'perceptual' side. Peirce never separates 'motor' and 'sensory'; neither is primary, though we may distinguish phases in which one or the other is dominant. Contemporary psychology is just beginning to take account of the full force of this position. (2) What is called thought is a matter of that form of signs that constitutes languages. **Thought** is language, and language is thought, not an expression or clothing for it. Since language is a mode of communication, 'logic is rooted in the social principle'—Peirce's own words. (3) Language elevates habit, otherwise physical and physiological, to the plane of acknowledged continuity, generality, or **reasonableness**. (4) There is no fixity nor finality in this process. Its nature is growth, indefinite and continuous. This continuity of growth is our chief ground for hope with respect to the future of man."

From Dr. Alfred North Whitehead, formerly of the Philosophy Department of Harvard University, and a man who is recognizedly one of the very greatest philosophical intellects living among men today:

"Peirce was a very great man, with a variety of interests in each of which he made original contributions. The essence of his thought was originality in every subject that he taught. For this reason none of the conventional labels apply to him. He conceived every topic in his own original way."

Lastly, from Paul Weiss, of the Department of Philosophy of Bryn Mawr College, and co-editor with Hartshorne of Peirce's COLLECTED PAPERS, I quote first from a paper delivered by him, in 1939 on the hundredth anniversary of Peirce's birth, before the American Philosophical Association at Columbia University, and then from a personal letter with a memorandum for this particular occasion.

"I am not concerned with praising Peirce—that would be impertinent—but in doing honor to him on this hundredth anniversary of his birth... Peirce was a metaphysician as well as a logician, a realist as well as a semiotician, a speculative thinker as well as an experimental scientist, an idealist as well as a naturalist, and a pragmatist who had a theory of ethics which acknowledged a fixed and universal ideal. These were not for him, and they ought not be for us, inconsistent positions. Truth is rich and complex enough to accommodate both the abstract and the concrete, the temporal and the eternal, the general and the specific, the absolute and the relative, the probable and the certain. Peirce was a philosopher precisely because he saw that these different factors were facets of one encompassing truth and reality, and that philosophy was not a point of view but a study of that which embraces all points of view."

I conclude this series of tributes with a paragraph from Dr. Weiss' letter for this occasion:

"Charles S. Peirce is one of the great minds of the 19th century. He was one of the most unusual, original and erudite men born in America. He is the founder of pragmatism—America's great contribution to philosophy; he is the founder of the modern theory of signs; he is one of the founders of modern logic; he was one of the very few in the history of thought who was at home equally in the laboratory and the library, in ancient and modern thought, in English and German culture. He influenced Royce, James, Dewey, Cohen, his editors, and a host of other thinkers in this century. Almost entirely ignored in his day, he is now becoming better and better known as one of America's great contributions to civilization."

### III.

In contemplating and executing a worthy memorial to Charles Sanders Peirce in this community you are honoring not only him, but yourselves, and ultimately, the nation. It is the happy destiny of this village to have vouchsafed habitation to this man who lived quietly in your midst not so many years gone. You could hardly have understood that a titan of intellectual glory was living among you. Even university circles were strangely negligent and cruelly inappreciative, with far less excuse. Now that we better understand what manner of mind he was, it is time to pay our respects in a tangible and lasting form.

In addressing you as members of the Pike County Historical Society, I would remind you that your Society, in contemplating this project, is acting not merely as a custodian of the past, but as trustees of the future, since the influence of this man grows with each passing year. Consequently, it behooves you to think of memorials that will themselves grow with the coming years. Obviously you will want to purchase the six volumes of his COLLECTED PAPERS, along with three books on him, namely: CHANCE, LOVE, and LOGIC, edited by Morris Cohen; THE PHILOSOPHY OF PEIRCE, by Justus Buchler; also, PEIRCE'S EMPIRICISM by Buchler. But

I am thinking even more of the raising of funds for establishing a Charles S. Peirce Scholarship, the income from which to be given annually to that boy or girl graduating from the local academy who ranks highest in science and mathematics, thus enabling him or her to attend college. Perhaps the finest possibility of all for you to consider is the following suggestion from Dr. Weiss. I was excited by the thought and I think you will be. He writes:

"It is good that Milford acknowledges him in this public way. In fact, it would be very nice if these ideas of yours could be supplemented by a yearly lectureship on some phase of Peirce. I think it would be necessary to put up no more than the fare and a modest stipend in order to get a distinguished scholar to lecture at Milford each year on the anniversary of Peirce's birth."—which is the tenth of September.

Do you not have a vision of what this would mean to Milford? You already have your summer theatre. The execution of this project would still further distinguish Milford as a community of culture, through the honoring of its great citizen and the bringing of distinguished scholars to its people.

Though not a completely native Milfordite like your Gifford Pinchot who, as I understand, knew Mr. Peirce in the flesh; yet, philosopher and citizen Peirce must have loved this town and countryside where he gave up his years to great thoughts. Milford, through the medium of this Historical Society, has a large trust to perform. Keeping alive the value of a very great man is not the kind of privilege and responsibility that falls to every town. The world of letters and scholarship is concerned with your action beyond this present occasion. Milford will not fail to do the generous and significant thing for herself, for the larger community of human culture, and for her immortal son.

NOTE—Three weeks after the delivery of this present paper, the author sent, to the chief philosophical journals of Britain and America, a notice in which he announced his intention of founding at Milford a Charles S. Peirce Society. Doctors Weiss and Hartshorne have consented to act as advisers. Membership will be open on a local, national, and international basis. Such a Society would consider and manage such projects as have been mentioned in the above paper, as well as others that may well be conceived and executed. For example: Peirce's remains are at present resting in a neglected plot, with only this inscription on the plainest and smallest of headstones: CHARLES S. PEIRCE; and then, below his name: Juliette Peirce, 1934. A fitting monument is one of the first considerations for a Peirce Society.

